Verge - Reading Assignment

[ghiasi12reza]

1. What two pieces of information are shielded on Verge?
   The IP address, as TOR is implemented in their wallets, and addresses through Dual-key Stealth addresses

2. What information is NOT shielded on Verge?
   Amount of transaction

3. Suppose Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known. Describe how an attacker could link Bob and Alice together, even using the privacy features mentioned above.
   By linking the time of sent and received transactions

[madingo]

Verge - Reading

1. The two information that are shielded on Verge are:

• addresses
• IP addresses (Tor) wallets.

2. The information that is not shielded on Verge is the transaction amount.

3. " Suppose sends 15 XVG to Bob and Alice’s and Bob’s Master Public Keys are Publicly Known".

• Because the Master Public Keys are Known for both Alice and Bob, and the fact that the transaction amount are not shielded, an attacker could track the amount when it is transferred from the one time address to Bobs bank account from his wallet to determine the receiver.

[Alko89]

@madingo

IP addresses (dual key stealth)

Stealth keys hide address.

[madingo]

Sure of course. Thanks for reminding me. I have made the correction.

[Alko89]

I checked, these are not IP addresses but addresses on the blockchain

[madingo]

Ok, will amend. Thanks

[bdoherty]

1. What two pieces of information are shielded on Verge?
   IP address and receiver addresses
2. What information is NOT shielded on Verge?
   Amounts
3. Suppose Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known. Describe how an attacker could link Bob and Alice together, even using the privacy features mentioned above.
   Monitor the network and analyse the txn amounts

[Raquel]

1.- IP by XVG that are sending tx via Tor and Duckey stealth addresses.
2.- The amounts.
3.- The spent amounts are visible so can be linkable to the UTXOs.

[Sam_Clare]

1. What two pieces of information are shielded on Verge?
   The IP addresses and the receiver address

2. What information is NOT shielded on Verge?
   Amount, sender address

3. Suppose Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known. Describe how an attacker could link Bob and Alice together, even using the privacy features mentioned above.
   By monitoring the network for matching amounts

[cge5009]

1. IP address and Receiver Address.
2. Amount, Sender Address.
3. The attacker could look for UTXOs matching that amount and then check if the receiving address is Bobs.

[Mihir23]

1. Verge implements Tor IP obfuscation for enabling anonymous communication across its network. It also implements stealth addresses that anonymize the receiving party.

2. The address of the sender and the amount sent in the transaction are not protected.

3. Since the sender’s address and the amount sent are unobfuscated, the attacker can link Alice and Bob by analyzing how much was sent and received.

[bbss]

1. IP address and Receiver Address.

2. Amount, Sender Address.

3. An attacker could correlate addresses with amounts.

[kylemoore8]

1. The IP address as TOR is implemented in their wallets and addresses through Dual-key Stealth addresses and RingCT.

2. Transaction amounts.

3. They can be linked by analyzing transactions completed on the network.

[Uyan]

1. With Verge, recipient addresses are shielded with stealth addresses, and IP addresses are shielded by wallets with built-in Tor integration.

2. I didn’t see anything mentioned about transactions, so I imagine transaction amounts are not shielded on Verge. Sender addresses aren’t shielded either.

3. We now suppose that Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known.
   Recipient addresses are shielded, but sender addresses aren’t. So someone “listening” to the blockchain and analysing transaction outputs could look for some wallet receiving 15 XVG. Then with the master public keys, which “allows senders to create an unlimited number of one-time destinations addresses on behalf of the recipient”, the attacker could look for the public address that has received 15 XVG.

[Dani_Kavcic]

1. Verge shields both parties IP addresses by impementing TOR in the wallet + adding dual-key stelth addresses and RingCT to keep all parties anonymous.

2. Amounts of transactions can be seen on “verge block explorer”.

3. By analizing transactions they could be linked together.

[Cestrada]

1. IP address with Tor and receiver address with stealth.
2. The amounts are not shielded
3. By analyzing the timing of the transactions with amounts.

[Bull75rm]

1. The IP address and addresses.
2. The amount of transactions is not shielded.
3. They can be linked by analyzing transactions completed on the network.

[LukeS]

1. IP addresses and wallet addresses
2. Amounts per transaction and most likely sender addresses will be public
3. Alice’s address would most likely be public and knowing the amount transferred, one could possibly match up the amounts transferred and received within a given time span of the transaction.

[mervxxgotti]

1. What two pieces of information are shielded on Verge? — IP since Tor hides this in wallet and address through dual key stealth addresses
2. What information is NOT shielded on Verge? — transaction amounts
3. Suppose Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known. Describe how an attacker could link Bob and Alice together, even using the privacy features mentioned above. — analyzing completed transactions

[ol_frank]

1. What two pieces of information are shielded on Verge?
   IP (integrates Tor) and addresses (Dual Key Stealth Addressing)

2. What information is NOT shielded on Verge?
   Amounts

3. Suppose Alice sends 15 XVG to Bob, and Alice’s and Bob’s ‘Master Public Keys’ are publicly known. Describe how an attacker could link Bob and Alice together, even using the privacy features mentioned above.
   linking through transaction amounts and guesstimating timings